Peaceful Purposes
List of contributors
Laetitia Cesari
PJ Blount
Antonino Salmeri
INTRODUCTION
by Laetitia Cesari
The notion of “peaceful purposes” in outer space law, though foundational and widely referenced, remains legally ambiguous and sometimes contested in its scope and application. Rooted in customary international law and embedded in the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the principle permits limited support and defensive roles for military personnel and assets in outer space but nominally restricts military activity on celestial bodies. Debates persist over whether “peaceful” equates merely to “non-aggressive” or entails broader “weaponisation”, especially in the context of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) agenda item, at the UN level and how this affects emerging practices like the placement of disruptive assets in outer space or the conduct of malicious activities affecting space infrastructure.
by PJ Blount
The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is one of the most important, most contested, and most misunderstood norms of space law. It is almost universally recognized as a feature of international space law, but at the same time its meaning as a constraint or obligation lacks clarity. The principle that space should be used for peaceful purposes is rooted in the customary international law of space. It is repeated in nearly every UN General Assembly resolution on space, finds itself in the name of the UN body dedicated to space activities (UNCOPUOS), and is a constant feature of diplomatic statements and texts regarding outer space. As such, it constitutes a threshold for the legality of space activities and a grundnorm for space law.
Unfortunately, the content of this pervasive norm is contested in the international community and subject to change as states vie for interpretive authority and legitimacy in the space domain. Peaceful Purposes, as a legal norm, finds itself stretched between concepts such a demilitarized and de-weaponized and among adjacent legal norms such as the ban on the use of force, the principle of nonaggression, and the right to self-defense. In the wider arena of international law, the concept of ‘peace’ is relative to the concept of ‘defense,’ which has led some scholars to argue that Peaceful Purposes means nothing more than non-aggressive. Yet, at the same time, there seems to be specific usage and employment of the concept in the space regime, which has led other scholars to argue that concept must have more normative content than the baselines extant in the general law concerning the use of force.
Part of the issue that leads to this problem is the customary nature of Peaceful Purposes. The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty included it in the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty as an umbrella concept for space, but only used it once in the binding treaty text in Article IV. In Article IV, the Moon and other celestial bodies are reserved “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” and – critically – this article includes specific limitations on the military uses of celestial bodies. The word “exclusively” in this clause only furthers the ambiguity of our understanding of the broader norm as applied to space. If space is for Peaceful Purposes but not exclusively so, then what has been barred and what is allowed?
The contested nature of this term should not surprise us. The UN Charter’s ban on the use of force sits at the heart of the contemporary system of international law, and is itself highly contested as debates on collective security, the nature of self-defense, and humanitarian intervention have shown us. Peaceful Purposes’ adjacency to this legal norm means that it has become a locale of contestation as well. Core principles in legal systems are often battlegrounds for understanding the nature of the system. Peaceful Purposes is no different. It sits at the heart of space law, and as such will continue to evolve as states vie to interpret it and bend it to their desires.
by Antonino Salmeri
Under Article IV (2) of the Outer Space Treaty, “the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes”. There is universal agreement in recognizing that this article outlaws all kinds of military activities on celestial bodies (including those conducted for defensive purposes) while allowing the use of “military personnel” as well as of any “equipment or facilities” when necessary for exclusively peaceful activities.
Insofar as space resource activities make “use” of celestial bodies, I argue that they are fully bound by the principle of exclusively peaceful purposes. While the applicability of this principle provides a fundamental safeguard for international cooperation in the exploration and use of celestial bodies, its practical implications on the conduct of space resource activities are virtually unexplored in space law literature (with the relevant exception of The Hague Building Blocks). Two important questions in particular concern whether Article IV (2) OST imposes any limitation on the kind of entities that can conduct space resource activities, as well as on the purposes for the use of space resources.
As is well-known, Article IV (2) OST adopts a strict approach concerning the involvement of military entities in the exploration and use of celestial bodies. After providing a non-exhaustive list of specific prohibitions, the provision specifically authorizes (1) the use of military personnel for scientific research (or any other peaceful purposes) and (2) the use of “any equipment or facility” which might be “necessary” for the peaceful exploration of the Moon. In both cases, the military involvement seems to be limited to a supportive role within the context of another activity in the peaceful exploration and/or use of celestial bodies. Based upon this reading of Article IV (2) OST, it seems that military entities do not have the right to autonomously engage in the exploration and use of celestial bodies, including space resource activities. In accordance with the exceptions laid down in the provision, they might only provide “in kind” support – i.e. personnel, equipment and facilities – to space resource activities conducted by civilians.
Whether Article IV (2) OST limits the use of space resources to exclusively peaceful purposes is by no means another complex issue. A literal interpretation of the provision would suggest a negative answer, for the simple reason that recovered or extracted space resources possess an autonomous legal standing and do not fall under the definition of “celestial bodies”. However, testing this conclusion against the object and purpose of Article IV (2) OST would suggest otherwise. As we have seen together, the main purpose of this article is to provide for the complete demilitarization of celestial bodies as a means to ensure international cooperation in their exploration and use as well as to preserve international peace and security on Earth. Envisioning the use of space resources within military activities or for military purposes – like weapons manufacturing – seems to be in open conflict with the vital goals pursued by Article IV (2) OST. In my view, such behaviours would defeat the object and purpose not only of Article IV (2), but of the whole OST. Accordingly, I would argue that space resources shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
To conclude, it seems safe to state that under Article IV (2) OST:
- Space resource activities shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes;
- Only civilian entities shall be entitled to autonomously engage in space resource activities. Military entities could provide in-kind support to civilian space resource activities in the form of personnel, equipment and/or facilities;
- Space resources – including any product derived therefrom – can be owned by any entity so long as they are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
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The views and opinions expressed in each contribution are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the IISL.
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